Since the publication of Susan Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991) seminal Response Style Theory of depressive rumination, a wealth of research has demonstrated that rumination plays an important role in the onset and maintenance of depression. More recently, rumination has been examined within the context of anger, and findings have suggested that ruminating about anger-inducing events heightens or maintains anger and increases aggression. Given these unhelpful effects, why do people ruminate in response to anger? The current experiment examined the potential role of positive beliefs about rumination in maintaining this process.
Introduction
Rumination is a type of repetitive and perseverative thinking. In the context of depression, the focus of rumination is often on the causes and consequences of one's negative mood state (i.e., depressive rumination; e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008) . The publication of Susan Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991) seminal modelthe Response Style Theory of depressive rumination -sparked a now extensive literature on this topic. Subsequent work inspired by response style theory has convincingly implicated rumination in the onset and maintenance of depression. Although rumination has been studied most extensively in the context of depression, this cognitive process has received increasing empirical attention in the anger literature, including a seminal paper by Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) . In studying angry rumination, i.e., rumination in response to anger-provoking situations, researchers have drawn on the theory, methods and approaches to studying rumination that were pioneered by Professor Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues.
We hope to convey this wider influence of Professor Nolen-Hoeksema's work in the psychological literature by contributing a paper that describes an experiment that manipulated beliefs about angry rumination. We hope that this will be a small yet fitting gesture of acknowledgement of the tremendous breadth of impact of her work across our field.
Angry rumination is defined as "perseverative thinking about a personally meaningful anger-inducing event" (Denson, 2013, p. 103) . Rumination in response to anger and rumination in response to sadness have been found to represent two distinct constructs (Peled & Moretti, 2010) . That is, when participants completed anger rumination and sadness rumination questionnaires, factor-analysis revealed anger rumination and sadness rumination were two distinct sub-factors of a general rumination factor, which independently predicted aggression and depressed mood, respectively. The items in the two rumination questionnaires were identical, except for the relevant emotional words. For example, 'I keep thinking about the reasons for my anger/sadness', and 'When something makes me angry/sad, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind'. There is increasing empirical evidence that rumination in the context of anger plays a key role in increasing or maintaining levels of anger as well as augmenting aggression (e.g., Bushman, 2002; Anestis, Anestis, Selby, & Joiner, 2009; Peled & Moretti, 2010; Vasquez, Pedersen, Bushman, Kelley, Demeestere, & Miller, 2013) . In an early study in this area, Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) found that rumination exacerbated anger whereas distraction decreased it, and concluded that anger rumination and rumination in response to depression share a focus of attention on the causes of the negative affective state. The findings of subsequent experiments have suggested that dwelling on anger-inducing experiences (i.e., angry rumination) may be particularly harmful because it increases aggression over extended periods (up to 8 hours), even toward innocent individuals (Bushman, 2002; Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Denson, Pederson, & Miller, 2006) . In a recent study, Denson et al. (2012) instructed participants to recall an anger-eliciting memory and then engage in either rumination, cognitive reappraisal, or distraction, or participants were not given instructions (i.e., in the control condition). Participants who ruminated reported maintained anger, while those in the remaining conditions reported reductions in anger levels. Consistent with these laboratory findings, there is evidence that chronic angry rumination is related to increased self-reported domestic abuse and road rage (Denson et al., 2006; Suhr & Nesbit, 2013) .
These adverse outcomes of rumination in the context of anger prompt a critical question: why do people continue to ruminate when this style of thinking can have such detrimental effects? One factor that has been linked to the persistence of rumination in response to depression is the tendency to hold metacognitive beliefs about the perceived benefits of engaging in ruminative thought (e.g., rumination helps me to solve my problems; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 4 2005) . In an experimental study, Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, and Kandris (2010) found that participants who held high levels of positive beliefs about the advantages of engaging in rumination about their depressed mood state reported more rumination following the completion of a laboratory-based stressor task (i.e., solving insoluble anagrams under time pressure) than did participants with low levels of such beliefs. Interestingly, this betweengroup difference was observed regardless of whether participants received positive or negative feedback on their performance on the task or even when no feedback was given, confirming the role of metacognitive beliefs in increasing the likelihood of rumination.
To date, the question of whether beliefs about the benefits of angry rumination play a role in the persistence of rumination about anger-eliciting events has been minimally addressed (Denson, 2013) . Anger and sadness differ on a number of dimensions including approach-avoidance and arousal (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009 ). Thus, it is important to examine the extent to which beliefs about anger and angry rumination influence the likelihood of engaging in rumination, and associated affective responses -as is the case for depressive rumination. In the one study reported in the literature that investigated beliefs about anger rumination, Simpson and Papageorgiou (2003) qualitatively assessed ten individuals with anger control problems with a semi-structured interview. All participants reported rumination during and following an anger-eliciting event and eight of the participants indicated that they held positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination. The authors noted that the themes of these beliefs included self-justification and attempts to gain insight and understand difficulties (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003) . Some of these themes are particularly relevant to angry rumination, but others could apply to depressive rumination as well.
This suggestive evidence of the role of metacognitive beliefs in driving angry rumination underscores the need for clinical interventions that modify these beliefs in order 5 to reduce the likelihood that clients will engage in rumination. One experimental procedure with scope to provide a pre-clinical experimental test of the efficacy of such an approach is cognitive bias modification (CBM; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002 ; see also Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006; Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009 ).
CBM is a computerised methodology that has enabled researchers to address questions of causality by providing systematic training in order to modify the direction of maladaptive habitual cognitive biases. Participants are typically presented with training conditions in which they are exposed to repeated presentations of exemplar stimuli that are designed to manipulate the cognitive bias relevant to the condition under examination. Two earlier experiments showed that CBM targeting metacognitive beliefs and appraisals in regard to sad or distressing intrusive memories modulated the frequency of these memories (Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009; Woud, Holmes, Postma, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2012) .
To summarise, there is evidence that positive metacognitive beliefs about the advantages of rumination are associated with the tendency to ruminate (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005) . In turn, rumination about angry mood has been found to fuel this potentially dysfunctional and harmful mood state (Bushman, 2002; Denson et al., 2006; Denson et al., 2012) . As demonstrated by two experimental studies (Lang et al., 2009; Woud et al., 2012) , CBM can be used to modify beliefs about cognitive processes such as intrusive memories. Collectively, these findings give rise to the hypothesis that a CBM procedure may also be effective in changing metacognitive beliefs about the use of rumination in the context of anger, and may in turn reduce angry mood.
In the present study we tested the hypothesis that manipulating metacognitive beliefs about rumination would modulate subsequent levels of anger and aggression. Specifically, we compared the impact of CBM training that was designed to induce positive versus negative metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of rumination in response to anger. After the training, we measured participants' predicted aggressive responses to hypothetical angerevoking scenarios. We predicted that participants who were trained to hold positive beliefs about rumination would endorse higher levels of anger and aggression in response to these scenarios than participants who were trained to adopt negative beliefs about rumination. To rule out group differences in other forms of emotion regulation, and to gauge the specificity of the training effect, we included baseline measures of reappraisal, suppression, and implicit preferences for emotion regulation.
Method Participants
A total of 110 undergraduates were recruited from the first year participant pool in the School of Psychology at the University of New South Wales (UNSW). Data from 11 participants were not obtained due to computer malfunction. The final dataset included 99 participants with a mean age of 19.16 years (SD = 2.11), of which 68 were women. English was the native language of 74 of the participants whereas the other 25 participants had a different native language. Their level of English was sufficient to be admitted as a student at UNSW. Participants were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions, with 49 participants in the positive beliefs about rumination condition and 50 in the negative beliefs about rumination condition.
Materials Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS).
The DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995 ) is a 42-item self-report instrument that indexes anxiety, depression and stress over the previous week on a 4-point scale (0 = did not apply to me at all, 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the time). The DASS possesses high internal consistency (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995 ). Cronbach's alpha in the current sample was .90 for the depression subscale, .83 for the anxiety subscale, and .90 for the stress subscale.
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ).
The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) was administered to index the tendency to use reappraisal and suppression in order to regulate emotions. Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with statements such as 'I control my emotions by not expressing them' on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly agree). Test-retest reliability across three months was found to be 0.69 for both scales (Gross & John, 2003) . In the current sample, Cronbach's alpha for the reappraisal subscale was .83 and was .74 for the suppression subscale.
Emotion Regulation Implicit Association Test (ER-IAT).
We employed the ER-IAT used by Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, and Gross (2006) as a means by which to index the extent to which participants held positive implicit attitudes toward emotion regulation.
Participants were presented with emotion regulation words (e.g., controlled, contain), emotional expression words (e.g., expressive, emotional), positive words (e.g., pleasant, good), and negative words (e.g., negative, bad). They were instructed to categorise each word as fast as possible into the good/bad categories by pressing the 'E' or the 'I' key of the keyboard without making mistakes.
The ER-IAT consisted of five blocks. Blocks 1, 2 and 4 were practice blocks consisting of 20 trials each. In Block 1, participants were asked to categorize the emotion regulation words versus the emotional expression words. In Block 2, participants were asked to categorize the positive words versus the negative words. In Block 3, participants were asked to categorize emotion regulation words with the positive words versus the emotional expression words with the negative words (20 practice trials followed by 40 critical trials). In Block 4, participants were asked to categorize the emotion regulation versus emotional expression words again, but now with switched key assignments. In Block 5, participants 8 were asked to categorize emotional expression words with positive words versus emotion regulation words with negative words (20 practice trials and 40 critical trials) using the key assignments of Block 4. If participants gave an incorrect answer an X appeared on the screen until they pressed the correct key.
Each participant's ER-IAT score (D) was calculated according to the procedure described by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) . All trials with a response latency greater than 10,000 ms were removed from the dataset. For each participant, the SD across trials was calculated to adjust for latency variance. The average response times were then divided by this SD. Participants' final score consisted of the product of subtracting the averages in Block 3 from the averages in Block 5. A higher score represented an implicit preference for emotion regulation versus emotional expression.
Cognitive bias modification (CBM).
A CBM training procedure was used to induce positive versus negative beliefs about the use of rumination, both in general, and specifically in response to anger. Specifically, positive beliefs were induced by items promising positive outcomes of the use of rumination (e.g., 'Analysing myself when I'm angry helps me to problem solve'). The negative beliefs were induced using items that advocated the absence of positive outcomes of ruminating (e.g., 'Analysing myself when I'm angry never helps me to problem solve'). The CBM procedure consisted of a training phase followed by a recognition test to assess whether the intended bias was induced, following the procedures of Mathews and Mackintosh (2002) and Woud et al. (2012) .
Training phase. The items in the CBM task were based on items related to rumination used in two previous CBM studies (Lang, Moulds, & Holmes, 2009; Woud et al., 2012) , items from the Positive Beliefs about Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001) , and items from the revised version of the PBRS (Watkins & Moulds, 2005) .
Participants read a description of the process of rumination, and were then instructed that they would next be presented with 'a series of statements which relate to thoughts and feelings people may have regarding rumination'. They were asked to imagine themselves in each statement as vividly as possible. Statements always appeared on the screen in two parts.
The first part remained on screen for 2s. The second part then appeared on screen with one or more words from which a letter was missing. Participants were asked to press a button on the keyboard when they knew what the first missing letter was, and then to type that letter. The completed sentence was shown on the screen. The content of the statement formed either a positive or a negative belief about rumination depending on experimental condition.
The training phase consisted of 72 target statements and 8 filler statements. These were presented in eight Blocks of 10 statements each. Each block contained 9 rumination target statements and 1 filler statement. To ensure active encoding of the meaning of the statements, randomly selected statements (4 in each Block) were followed by a comprehension question. The program provided feedback on each answer by displaying 'correct!' or 'incorrect!' The comprehension questions were formulated in such a way that the correct answer was 'yes' 50% of the time in both experimental conditions.
To illustrate, an example of a target statement was 'Analysing myself when I'm angry' followed by 'helps me to pr_blem solve' in the positive beliefs condition or 'never helps me to pr_blem solve' in the negative beliefs condition. The related comprehension question was 'Does analysing when you are down help you problem solve?' An example of a filler statement is 'I am always thinking about' followed by 's_mething'. Crucially, filler items did not directly refer to outcomes of rumination, whereas the target items did.
Test of induced bias. Following the procedure of Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) and Woud et al. (2012) , the assessment of the bias induction included an encoding and a recognition stage. During the encoding stage, participants were presented with one practice scenario about a family picnic in the park, followed by 10 new critical statements about the use of rumination. In contrast to items from the training phase, these 10 statements remained neutral in terms of whether or not rumination was favoured (e.g., 'If I'm feeling angry, it is best to try to react in a way that is appropriate'). Each statement was preceded with a brief title (e.g. 'Reacting to anger'). Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the statements as vividly as possible and to rate the vividness on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all vivid, 5 = extremely vivid).
In the recognition phase participants were presented with the statement titles (e.g., ). The foil items were included to check whether any biases that were observed following the CB training were specific to beliefs about rumination or rather reflected a general positivity or negativity bias. Although all items refer to rumination, the crucial difference here is that the target items refer to a consequence of rumination (i.e., a specific belief about rumination) whereas the foil items do not.
Aggressive Provocation Questionnaire (APQ). The APQ (O'Conner, Archer, & Wu, 2001 ) was used to measure aggressive feelings and responses towards anger-invoking scenarios. The APQ consists of 12 anger provoking scenarios (e.g., people making noise and kicking your chair at the cinema). In the present study, the APQ was modified so as to be relevant to an Australian undergraduate sample. Accordingly, 7 scenarios were excluded that described work situations (because our participants were students), routine driving (because the participants were unlikely to have their own car), or family situations (because the participants were unlikely to be married with children).
Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the situation and then rated how In order to increase the number of items, an additional scenario taken from DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, and Gailliot (2007) was included. This scenario describes a stranger engaging in flirtatious behaviour with the participant's (hypothetical) partner which is reciprocated by him/her, resulting in aggressive behaviour of the stranger towards the participant. Participants were asked to rate how likely it was that they would smash a nearby beer bottle on the stranger's head (-5 = not at all likely, 0 = neither likely nor unlikely, 5 = extremely likely). Other minor edits were made to the wording of some scenarios in the APQ to reflect more common Australian language use (e.g., 'lads' was translated to 'young boys').
In the current sample, Cronbach's alphas or the 5 APQ scenarios that were included were 0.75 for the anger scale, 0.79 for the frustration scale, and 0.79 for the irritation scale.
Procedure
All participants were tested individually. They provided informed consent and completed the ERQ, DASS and the ER-IAT. They were then randomly assigned to either the positive beliefs or the negative beliefs about rumination condition. Participants completed the CBM training followed by the encoding and recognition assessment phases, after which they completed the APQ. Finally, they were debriefed, thanked for their time and assigned course credit. The ERQ, DASS and APQ were presented using Medialab software (version 2008.1.20; Jarvis, 2007) , the ER-IAT was presented using Inquisit software (version 2.0.6; 2008) and the CBM procedure was presented using E-Prime (version 1; 2002).
Results

Statistical approach
Group differences were tested with t-tests unless otherwise specified. All tests were two-tailed with a significance level of .05. Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for all measures within and across experimental groups. Effect sizes are reported in Cohen's d.
Randomisation checks
There was no significant difference between the experimental groups in age, t (97) 
Discussion
We tested the hypothesis that beliefs about rumination influence predicted levels of anger and aggression in response to anger-provoking situations. In contrast to our prediction, participants in the positive beliefs condition predicted that they would feel less angry in response to the anger-provoking scenarios than participants in the negative beliefs condition.
However, when implicit preferences for emotion expression (i.e., the ER-IAT scores) were entered as a covariate, the strength of this effect was reduced to a trend. To the extent that engaging in rumination may map on to a preference for emotion regulation, it appears that the CBM training was unable to entirely overrule the influence of personal preferences in emotional regulation on anger. However, a link between implicit emotion regulation preference and rumination is not straightforward and therefore, at this stage, we can only speculate as to why implicit preferences in emotional regulation reduced the experimental effect to a non-significant trend.
Although the effect of beliefs about rumination on predicted anger responses was only marginally significant, the fact that the group means were in the opposite direction than expected warrants discussion. First, participants in the positive beliefs condition were trained to believe that rumination would be a helpful strategy in response to anger-provoking situations. As a result, participants in this condition may have expected to feel less angry in response to the scenarios described in the APQ. Indeed, meta-cognitions about rumination could include the expectation that engaging rumination will prevent one's feelings of anger from escalating (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003) . Another possibility is that in the current study, rumination in response to anger actually reduced anger, although given that previous research has repeatedly found that engaging in rumination exacerbates anger responses (Bushman, 2002; Denson et al., 2006; Denson et al., 2012) , this seems unlikely. Therefore, we suggest that it is seems more plausible to interpret the current findings in light of a dissociation between beliefs about rumination and expected anger responses on the one hand, and active engagement in rumination and actual anger responses on the other.
Interestingly, participants in the positive beliefs condition as well as the negative beliefs condition showed a positive belief bias towards rumination, although the bias was more pronounced in the former group. This suggests that, at least in a population of first year psychology students, there may be a general belief that analysing the causes and meanings of an angry mood state is beneficial. A possible reason as to why participants in the negative beliefs condition did not show a negative bias towards rumination is that the CBM training items may have been more ambiguous in this condition than in the positive beliefs condition.
For example, in response to the target statement 'Analysing myself when I'm angry' participants in the positive beliefs condition received the sentence 'helps me to pr_blem solve', thereby clearly indicating the message that ruminating is a good thing to do. In contrast, the sentence 'never helps me to pr_blem solve', which participants in the negative beliefs condition received, could feasibly have been perceived to be more ambiguous about whether rumination is actually harmful or whether it is merely ineffective.
There are a few limitations that need to be discussed. First, participants rated their predicted responses to hypothetical anger-provoking scenarios but were not actually provoked into an angry mood state. However, previous research suggests that individual differences in risk for perpetrating aggression is consistently positively related to predicted aggressive reactions in response to scenarios such as those used in the present research (e.g., O'Connor et al., 2001; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003; Marsee & Frick, 2007; Tremblay & Ewart, 2005) . Second, no measure of rumination was included and therefore it is unclear whether participants actually engaged in rumination in response to the anger-provoking APQ scenarios or not. That is, we cannot assume that participants' predicted responses would reflect their actual responses when provoked into an angry mood state. Future studies should therefore include an actual anger-provoking situation (e.g., Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011) and also measure the extent to which participants report that they engage in rumination during this situation in order to overcome these limitations.
A third limitation was that although the CBM items in the positive beliefs condition clearly conveyed the message that rumination is beneficial, the items for the negative beliefs condition merely stated that rumination is not beneficial. Future studies should therefore include CBM items that clearly convey a stronger negative message about rumination in the negative beliefs condition and consider including an additional control condition in which a different strategy is being promoted in the CBM training (e.g., distraction; Rusting & NolenHoeksema, 1998; Denson et al., 2012) . The inclusion of such a control condition would also clarify whether the positive belief bias in our negative beliefs condition was reduced, the positive belief in our positive beliefs condition was increased, or both. Taken together, the findings of these two studies demonstrate that adaptive metacognitive appraisals can be effectively trained using CBM procedures, and furthermore, that experimentally training positive appraisals can have adaptive psychological consequences.
Successful CBM training aimed at reducing beliefs that may indirectly result in anger would be helpful in the treatment for individuals with anger management problems. Because individuals with clinically significant anger problems often have trouble identifying their angry state before their anger escalates, it may be helpful to modify beliefs about responses in order to change their immediate reactions to provocations. Conversely, we speculate that it might be possible that a successful CBM training aimed at training beliefs that will give rise to increases in anger might be useful for individuals who would likely benefit from assertiveness training. That is, despite the adverse outcomes of anger outlined earlier in this paper, we note literature that has demonstrated that under some circumstances, anger can facilitate beneficial outcomes. For example, anger can help in achieving one's goals (Aarts et al., 2010; van Kleef, de Dreu, &Manstead, 2004) , can make people less pessimistic about the future (Lerner, Gonzales, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) , help communicate needs in social relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wortman, 1990) , and help people perform better in confrontational tasks (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008) .
To summarize, we found that CBM training of positive and negative beliefs about rumination effectively changed beliefs about rumination and participants' expected responses to anger-provoking situations. In contrast to our hypothesis, participants in the positive beliefs condition expected to feel less angry in anger-provoking situations than participants in the negative beliefs condition (although this effect was only significant at trend level after controlling for implicit attitudes towards emotional expression versus suppression). The direction of the effect on beliefs and the translation from hypothetical scenarios to real-life anger provoking situations remains unknown. This study was the first to bring together the research fields of anger, rumination, and CBM training of beliefs about rumination. We have offered several concrete suggestions for future studies that we hope will further research in this area. Finding new ways to change beliefs about rumination in response to anger, e.g., through CBM training, may prove to have clinical benefits for individuals with anger management problems and individuals who find it hard to be assertive in social interactions.
Professor Nolen-Hoeksema's theory, methodologies and empirical findings have shaped the literature and our understanding about the role of rumination in depression. Such is the extent of her influence across the field of psychology that her work will without doubt continue to critically inform how we approach outstanding questions about the consequences of rumination across emotional states, including anger. 
